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1. Introduction
Many people believe that widespread political corruption exists in South Africa. In a survey
published by ID AS A in 1996, 46 per cent of the sample consulted felt that most officials
were engaged in corruption and only six per cent believed there was clean government1. In
another poll conducted by the World Value Survey, 15 per cent of the respondents were
certain that all public servants were guilty of bribery and corruption and another 30 per cent
thought that most officials were venal2. The IDAS A survey indicated that 41 per cent of the
sample felt that public corruption was increasing. Most recently, Transparency International,
an international monitoring agency, has reported on a survey which confirms a growing
perception among foreign businessmen that official corruption in South Africa is
widespread3. These perceptions have probably been stimulated by the proliferation of press
reportage on corruption as well as debates between national politicians but the evidence
concerns perceptions and in itself is an unreliable indicator of the scope or seriousness of the
problem except in so far as the existence of such beliefs can encourage corrupt transactions
between officials and citizens. In reviewing the South African evidence this paper will
attempt to answer four questions. Is the present South African political environment
peculiarly susceptible to corruption? Were previous South African administrations especially
corrupt? What forms has political corruption assumed since 1994 and how serious has been
its incidence? Finally, does modern South African corruption mainly represent habits
inherited from the past or is it a manifestation of new kinds of behaviour?
There is general agreement about what constitutes political corruption. It is the "unsanctioned
or unscheduled use of public resources for private ends"4. It might take the form of
"misperformance or neglect of a recognised duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with
the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal"5. Political corruption
can be described as "a method of exploitation by which a constituent part of the public order
'iDASA Public Opinion Service, POS Reports, No. 3, February 1996, "Parliamentary Ethics and
Government Corruption: Playing with Public Trust".
2Summary Report of World Value Survey: South Africa, 1996, pp.37-41.
3Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 1997, press release, Johannesburg, 31 July,
1997. This agency collates the results of at least four surveys of perceptions with respect to 52 countries to
construct a ranking. South Africa's score out of 10.00 slipped from 5.68 to 4.95 between 1996 and 1997
locating it at 33rd position, between Malaysia and South Korea.
4Victor Levine, Political Corruption: The Ghana Case, Stanford University Press, 1975.
5Robert C Brooks, "The nature of political corruption" in Arnold J Heidenheimer (ed.), Political
Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York, 1970.
sphere is exploited as if it were part of the market sphere"6. Broader definitions of public
corruption also embrace electoral fraud as well as the rewarding by political parties of
specific constituencies in return for electoral support ("transactive corruption") but here we
will be concerned only with those transactions which are motivated by individuals seeking
material benefits. Political corruption is located within the institutions of government:
legislatures, courts, bureaucracies and statutory bodies such as parastatal corporations or
commissions. It is constituted by transactions or exchanges of public resources and benefits
between actors some or all of whom are officials or public representatives. It must involve
acts which are intentionally dishonest.
Most writers on corruption distinguish between degrees of severity of corruption both with
reference to where it occurs as well as its pervasiveness. Different administrations may be
characterised by routine, petty or low level bureaucratic corruption (for example, the habitual
extortion of bribes by minor officials) and grand corruption (the large scale misuse of public
resources by senior civil servants and politicians) or by both simultaneously7. Corruption
becomes systemic when corrupt activity begins to appear at all levels within a political system
and when it becomes repetitious, constituting a parallel set of procedures to those which
properly constitute the formal functions of the bureaucracy. Routine and open petty
corruption usually signifies a systemic condition of corruption; secretive grand corruption may
exist despite the absence of more pervasive bureaucratic misbehaviour. In administrations
in which corruption assumes systemic and epidemic forms the scale of misappropriation
substantially reduces public expenditure on development and services. For example in India
in the 1950s a government commission established that about 5 per cent of the money spent
during the second Five Year Plan was misappropriated8, in the Philippines in the 1970s about
20 per cent of internal revenue was lost through corruption9, and in Zaire between 1976 and
1977 of $280 million earned from coffee sales through the government monopoly only $130
million was recorded in the public accounts. Certain authorities have argued that corruption
may have beneficial developmental effects, especially in those cases in which formal
bureaucratic controls obstruct entrepreneurial growth10, but such instances usually involve the
6Jacob van Klaveren, "The Concept of Corruption" in Arnold Heidenheimer (ed.), Op cit, p. 38.
7Robert Theobold, "Lancing the swollen African state: will it alleviate the problem of corruption?",
Journal of Modern African Studies, 1994, 32, 4, pp. 701-706.
8David Bayley, "The effects of corruption in developing nations", Heidenheimer (ed.) op cit.
9Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, p. 20.
10See Nathanial Leff, "Economic development through corruption" in Heidenheimer, op cit and J S Nye,
"Corruption and political development: a cost benefit analysis", American Political Science Review, Vol. 56,
1967, M Beenstock, "Corruption and development", World Development, 7 1 1979. Most developmental
arguments favouring corruption suggest that the corrupt exchanges may result in better economic decisions as
well promoting efficiency through by passing bureaucratic control systems, additionally they may channel capital
into investment rather than consumption. Another beneficial effect of political corruption may be that it can
enhance social stability: one study of Japan suggests that constituency-based patronage systems have resulted
in generous levels of public investment in rural areas (Jan Marie Bouissou, "Gift networks and clientalism in
Japan as a redistributive system", Donnatella Delia Porta and Yves Meny (eds.), Democracy and Corruption
grandiose corruption of senior officials in exchange for subverting tender procedures rather
than routine petty venality which is generally agreed to be developmentally harmful.
Political corruption is often perceived to be especially characteristic of government in
developing countries11. For Robert Klitgaard it "probably constitutes one of the three or four
most harmful problems facing third world government"12. Samuel Huntington has argued
that its presence "correlates with rapid social and economic modernisation"13. There are
several reasons for believing this. In countries in which large scale centralised bureaucratic
administrations are fairly recent and imposed by outsiders there may exist a "wide divergence
between the aims, attitudes and methods of the government and those of the societies in
which they operate"14. In such contexts patrimonial values which arise from the persistence
in social relationships of kinship, clanship and clientship"15 may infuse bureaucracy from
below. Modernisation can enlarge government very swiftly, widening its scope of
intervention and regulation well beyond the capacity and supply of properly trained
personnel16 and the accompanying expansion of functions and services "multiplies
opportunities for corruption"17. Obviously this situation is accentuated if experienced
officials are replaced with junior functionaries or bureaucratic neophytes as often happens in
rapidly implemented programmes of indigenisation following independence. The pressure to
recruit civil servants en masse may be particularly intense following extensive political
mobilisation and the construction of huge armies of political party employees during the
decolonisation period. Cases of extreme corruption often correlate with situations in which
the state derives the majority of its revenues from external sources of easily controlled
enclaves within the national economy: African states' dependence upon customs receipts,
foreign aid, and state controlled monopolies in such commodities as oil or diamonds,
exploited under very restrictive conditions, are all cases in point. Each of these represent
weak imperatives for domestic fiscal accountability and facilitate elite venality. In developing
countries the state is usually the major force within the modern economy and in general
conditions of economic scarcity and low levels of social stratification political and
bureaucratic power brings unprecedented opportunities for control over material resources;
In Europe, Pinter, London, 1997).
uBekker, J C, "Nepotism, corruption and discrimination: A predicament for a post apartheid South African
public service", Politikon, 18 2 1991.
12Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988.
13Samuel Huntington, "Modernisation and corruption" in Heidenheimer (ed.), Op cit, p. 490,
14M. McMullen, "A Theory of Corruption", Sociological Review, 1961, p. 184.
15Theobold, op cit.
16See, for example: Paul Wellings, "Making a fast buck: capital leakage and public accounts in Lesotho",
African Affairs, 82, 329, October 1983.
17Gillespie, K., and Okruhlik, G., "The political dimensions of corruption clean-ups: a framework for
analysis", Comparative Politics, 1991, 24, 1, p.78.
in such circumstances, political office becomes the main route to personal wealth18.
Accordingly, relatively low levels of official corruption in, for example, Botswana, are
attributable to the existence of an indigenous ruling class which acquired its wealth before it
became ascendent in national politics19. Similarly, the more widespread corruption in
communist countries in comparison to liberal democracies is explained by the difficulty in the
former of maintaining moral and conceptual distinctions between private and public property
and individual and collective interests20. Recently, though, a succession of political scandals
in well established industrial democracies have helped to shift the focus of corruption studies
away from the developing world. Three political developments which have simultaneously
affected both mature industrial democracies and poor third world countries are believed to
have promoted corrupt government: the decentralisation of administration and with it the
delegation of financial authority; the introduction of market values into public administration;
and the growing costs of political competition in party systems in which political
organisations increasingly depend upon external sources of finance21.
As well these historical or contextual causes of corruption, a series of features associated with
particular kinds of polities help to encourage the proliferation of political corruption. These
include: bureaucratic secrecy and the absence of mutual surveillance procedures by
government agencies; protracted rule by one political party or an ageing one party dominant
system; administrative inefficiency and complicated hierarchical decision-making procedures
which create lengthy delays; and extensive patterns of political appointment in the civil
service. Finally, popular suppositions about the existence of generalised corruption can
encourage the spread of political corruption even if such beliefs initially exaggerate its extent
and character.
2. South African susceptibility
Do these generalisations which arise from comparative studies suggest that post Apartheid
South Africa may be particularly susceptible to political corruption? Ostensibly, South Africa
may not seem to share the structural predisposition towards corruption which many authorities
believe makes the condition endemic in other African countries. South Africa is not a typical
"developing country" nor is its current experience of socio-economic and political change
easily encapsulated by notions of modernisation. Compared to many former colonial
territories the state plays a minor, albeit an important role in the economy and it by no means
provides the main path for economic accumulation. In contrast to newly independent
countries, the government of newly democratic South Africa is attempting to contract or at
least stabilise public sector expenditure and employment, and the political pressures which
result from large scale unemployment are not as compelling as those which confronted other
18Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly, Longman, London, 1993.
19Kenneth Good, "Interpreting the exceptionality of Botswana", Journal of Modern African Studies, 30 1
1992. p. 72.
20Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993.
21Donatella Delia Porta and Yves Meny (eds.), Democracy and Corruption In Europe, Pinter, London,
1997.
African governments after decolonisation. In contrast to colonial administrations the
apartheid state was relatively effective and comparatively efficient and undertook a
considerable range of social welfare functions. South African relative immunity from
corruption is also suggested by those studies which contend that a particular historical
sequence of state development in which modernisation of the state, the development of
welfare functions and the extension of the franchise occur consecutively and are separated by
quite lengthy periods tends to produce less corrupt administrations than states in which these
developments occur simultaneously22. Arguably, state formation during a long period of
white political monopolies made it more difficult than elsewhere in African for the state to
be influenced by the persistence of old pre-industrial cultures of tribute. Finally the South
African state has for a long time depended for a major sources of its revenues on various
forms of personal taxation - even within the restricted democracy of white minority politics
this helped to limit the scope of official misbehaviour.
Has democratisation weakened or strengthened corrupt predispositions in South African
government? The theoretical and comparative insights referred to above indicate a
complicated answer to this question. The formation of nine regional governments has been
accompanied by a delegation downwards of certain areas of budgetary authority and this may
have interfered with previous controls though this may be compensated for by the dissolution
of homelands in which administrative corruption was sometimes endemic. On the other hand,
the incorporation into regional administrations of homeland civil services may merely have
transferred the bureaucratic location of corrupt behaviour and made regional governments
vulnerable to the patrimonial politics which affected certain homeland administrations.
Though the overall number of civil servants has not altered significantly in certain
departments and regional governments large numbers of senior officials have been replaced23
and many of the fresh recruits to senior managerial levels have been political appointments.
This, together with the demoralisation and fears about job insecurity amongst officials
employed by the pre-1994 administration may have helped to erode professional ethics24.
These in any case have been under attack with the adoption of new management policies
which are highly critical of "authoritarian, centralised and rule bound" operations and seek
to replace them with an organisation culture "with a new emphasis on communicating,
consulting, supporting, motivating and directing" and directed towards "the satisfaction of
22Andrew Adonis, "The UK: Civic virtue put to the test", Donnatella Delia Porta and Yves Meny (eds.),
op tit.
23By November 1996, 32 per cent of management positions and 52 per cent of senior management positions
in the civil service were occupied by Africans; in the pre 1994 "core" civil service Africans had held less than
5 per cent of such positions. Republic of South Africa, Public Service Commission, Report on the
Rationalisation of Public Administration in the Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, RP/1997, p. 81.
24A survey undertaken in 1992 by the HSRC of 5.320 members of the Public service association, found
that 75 per cent of its respondents were worried about reductions of benefits, that 58 per cent believed "that
merit as basis for appointment and promotion would disappear", 69 per cent expected replacement of staff as
a result of political appointments and that 60 per cent "were not positive" about affirmative action. Most
respondents were Afrikaans speaking, white men, and members of the National Party (Erwin Schwella,
"Bureaucrats hard to budge", DSA in Depth, August/September 1993, pp. 18-19.
needs, both of the public and of staff"25. Though the White Paper on public service
transformation stresses accountability and anti corruption measures the new policies require
a new range of managerial skills and quite different control systems. Meanwhile the
government is undertaking a range of new activities, extending welfare and development
services and establishing a set of new statutory bodies to safeguard constitutional rights. All
these present new challenges for financial regulation. Government policies which favour
black business empowerment and the movement of members of the ANC leadership into the
corporate sector may have also helped to promote a culture in which "public behaviour is less
prized than private, (and) producing results comes to matter more than observing standards,
monetary values more than ethical and symbolic values"26. On the other hand, the new
government's public commitment to an ethic of transparency and the institution of the office
of the Public Protector as well as the appointment of a number of official inquiries into
corruption has helped to stimulate a fresh willingness among newspaper editors to publish
corruption stories (which especially in the case of homeland venality used to be virtually
ignored). Moreover, partly as a consequence of affirmative action policies, government
tendering has become more fiercely contested and more subject to public commentary. In
short, a democratic constitution and the demise of racially and ethnically separated
administrations has considerably expanded the area of government open to scrutiny and
inspection. This needs to be kept in mind when considering the proliferation of reports of
corruption since 1994.
3. The historical legacy.
Government spokesmen argue that contemporary corruption is largely a carry-over from the
previous administration. Arguably, a bureaucracy which was deliberately used as an
instrument to foster the social and economic fortunes of one ethnically defined group had at
least a form of transactive corruption built into its functioning from the inception of National
Party rule. Deborah Posel, for example, has documented how the Native Affairs Department
in the 1950s "made a concerted effort to fill as many administrative posts as possible with
National Party supporters" while in the 1960s Broederbond infiltration of agricultural
cooperatives and the Land Bank ensured that political considerations would predominate in
credit allocation27. However these forms of patronage and favouritism were mainly geared
to the strategic goals of Afrikaner nationalism and they did not, at least at their inception,
involve personal gain and individualised relationships28. As late as the mid 1970s, J N
Cloete, director of the South African Institute for Public administration, could maintain that
the controls in the civil service were so stringent that bureaucrats had "little opportunity to
25Government Gazette, 15 May 1995, "Draft White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service"
pages 7 and 15.
26Yves Meny, "France, the end of the republican ethic", in Donatella Delia Porta and Yves Meny, op cit,
p. 18.
27Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1997, pp
117 and 243-244.
28Annette Seegers, "Toward an understanding of the Afrikanerisation of the South African state", Africa,
63 (4), 1993.
use patronage and the conferment of financial benefits for the achievement of improper
objectives"29. This seems to be confirmed by Auditor-General's reports for the 1950s and
early 1960s - the number of financial irregularities documented reached a comparatively
modest 252 in 1967, and were mainly concentrated in the post office, as well, as to much
lesser extents in justice, defence and police. There is plenty of evidence, though, to suggest
that by the 1980s, political corruption within the terms of the definition used in this paper,
was quite common in certain government departments as well as in homeland administrations.
The 1978 Information Department scandal featured senior officials using public funds to pay
for holidays for their families, tax free supplementary allowances, and properties registered
in their own names, as well as the R13 million loaned to Mr Louis Luyt to start up a
newspaper, most of which was subsequently invested on one of Luyt's companies30. The
Information scandal arose from the misuse of secret money and might have been exceptional
on those grounds but the Department's closure did not end the practice of secret financial
grants to government agencies. In the 1980s these were to expand considerably within
Defence expenditure, and within the loose accounting employed in the funding of arms
procurement and front companies there was plenty of room for official venality31. Even
outside the mysterious world of covert operations, though, central government departments
seem to have had a long history of routinised corruption. For example, within the
Department of Development Aid, the successor to the Native Affairs Department, a 1991
inquiry discovered "dishonesty and abuse (to be) rife", concluding that the "majority of
officials... have developed a syndrome of lack of enthusiasm to the extent sometimes of
apathy". Specific irregularities included fictitious tenders and the subsequent award of
contracts to spouses, the receipt of gifts by officials in return for contracts, and payments to
firms for imaginary work and materials: over the years several hundreds of millions of rands
was lost through various forms of nepotism and fraud in a department which administered
about 11 per cent of the government's budget32. Nor was abuse in this sphere confined to the
final years of apartheid: other official enquiries suggest that land transfers administered by
the South African Development Trust (a body under the authority of the Department of
Native affairs and its successors) had for decades been managed dishonestly and
incompetently.33
29J N Cloete, "The Bureaucracy" in Anthony de Crespigny and Robert Schrire, The Government and
Politics of South Africa, Juta, Cape Town, 1978, p. 74.
30For details see Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the former Department
of Information, Pretoria, RP/113/1978, pp. 34-60.
31See report on the David Kofmansky trial: Kit Katzen, "Mysteries and unanswered questions arise in the
CCB trial", The Star, 22 September, 1990. Kofmansky, a Sandton commodities broker, was charged with the
illegal export of R29 million, money he said he had been given by a Civil Cooperation Bureau operative to
establish an arms buying company in Britain.
32Republic of South Africa, Commission of Inquiry into Development Aid, Pretoria, RP 73/1992.
33For examples see: Republic of South Africa, Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na die 1980 -
onluste en beweerde wanbastuur in Kwandebele verslaag die Staatspresident, Pretoria, RP 137/1993; Republic
of South Africa, First Report by the Commission of Inquiry into alleged irregularities or malpractices regarding
the allocation, leasing, alienation and transfer of state lands, Pretoria, RP 52/1996.
8All these examples refer to elite or grand corruption, involving dishonest practices by senior
officials resulting in large scale misappropriation. Those departments which were especially
concerned with political/strategic goals of government - information, defence, and homeland
development seem to have been particularly affected by high level corruption. In addition,
several homeland governments, both "independent" and "self governing" supplied
documentation of political corruption on a major scale. In the Transkei, independence was
accompanied by the public takeover of South African property and the subsequent sale of
farms, firms and houses at very low prices to cabinet ministers and their friends and
associates. Subsequent activities by the Transkei Development Corporation and the
Agricultural Corporation included the politically directed allocation of trading licences and
property, loans to members of the same small circle, and the diversion of government
vehicles and equipment to their businesses and farms34. Official inquiries discovered
subsequently much the same pattern of behaviour in Kwandebele and Lebowa. In
Kwandebele, the Parsons Commission discovered a Rl million "kickback" to officials from
contractors for building work never undertaken and cabinet ministers appropriated discounts
from the government's purchases of luxury cars35. In Lebowa, the De Meyer report
described misdoings in the Chief Minister's Department as well as the Departments of Water,
Law and Order, Transport, Water Affairs and Education. Lebowa's chief minister, Nelson
Ramodike, attracted a major share of De Meyer's criticisms. At the time of the report's
appearance there were fresh press allegations. In addition to the two illegal liquor licences
uncovered by De Meyer, Ramodike was alleged to be running a string of state funded
businesses through various brothers and cousins as well as maintaining a personal fleet of
three top of the range Mercedes. Meanwhile, 200 officials within the Lebowa Department
of Justice received a 100 per cent pay increase in April 1993, and in October 1992 the
Lebowa Tender Board, already under fire from De Meyer, was prevailed upon despite
objections from three of its members, to accede to the purchase of R15 million worth of
cleaning chemicals, enough for seven years' supply to the government36. A similar deal
involving purchases of chemicals was authorised by Dr G L Becker, Secretary for the
QwaQwa Department of Health, at a cost of about 60 per cent of his department's annual
budget37. To be sure, these occurrences in the final years of these administrations may have
represented behaviour motivated by the realisation among officials that their powers and
privileges were shortly to be curtailed, but there are other reports dating from earlier periods
which suggest, as in the case of the Transkei, that graft was entrenched and routine in the
highest echelons of homeland administrations through much of their history. For example,
34Republic of the Transkei, Commission of Inquiry into the Conduct of the Department of Commerce,
Industry and Tourism, June 1987. See also Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed, Render unto Kaiser: A
Transkei Dossier, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1981, Chapter 7.
35Republic of South Africa, Verslag van die Kommissie van ondersoek na die 1980 - onluste en beweerde
wanbastuur in Kwandebele verslag an die staatspresident, Pretoria, RP 137/1993.
36Jacques Pauw, "From traffic policeman to Governor of Lebowa", The Star, 16 April, 1993, Justice
Malala, "Huge gravy train scandal in Lebowa", The Star, 29 September, 1993; Justice Malala, "Sun setting on
Ramodike's reign", The Star, 1 October, 1993; Norman Chandler, "Homeland graft revealed", The Star, 19
November, 1993.
37,i More homeland graft shocks", The Sowetan, 25 November, 1993.
the Skweyiya Commission in 1996 uncovered a carnival of misconduct dating from 1978,
beginning with former President Mangope's issue of irregular tenders, his appropriation of
state owned houses and farms, and his establishment of private businesses with public
funds38.
What about routine petty corruption before 1994? Its incidence probably varied in accordance
with the degree of rightlessness of the people seeking benefits or services from officials. In
the Transkei in 1975 more than R600,000 was stolen by civil servants from pensioners and
an official observed "that there were frequently shortages at points where money passes from
hand to hand between officials and the public". Within the Ministry of Justice, which
included the payment of pensions and disability grants within its functions, at least ten per
cent of its employees were known in 1971 to have accepted bribes39. In the Ciskei, the
Quail Commission in 1978 "heard evidence that pension payments were sometimes refused
for reasons the pensioners concerned could not understand, such as that 'no more money is
available'"40. In Kwa Zulu, legislative assembly debates in 1978 attested to the widespread
incidence of bribery within the civil service. Research conducted by Paulus Zulu in the early
1980s suggested that indunas and chiefs routinely extorted payments for site permits, work
seeker permits, pensions and disability grants41. Nor was everyday extortion confined to
homeland administrations: in Cape Town, for example, in the late 1980s, Bantu
Administration Board officials sold residence permits to inhabitants of Crossroads; as one of
Josette Cole's informants told her, "They always did this at the Nyanga and Langa offices.
It wasn't something new to us"42 On the East Rand, in 1959, Brandel-Syrier found that
African clerks in the administrative offices of the township in which she conducted fieldwork
charged a fixed "under the counter" fee for advice, referrals and appointments43. In the
1970s, black policemen were commonly believed to refrain from charging pass offenders in
exchange for bribes44. Pre-1994 police corruption is especially difficult to estimate; SAP
Commissioners reports list dismissals for misconduct but these would have embraced a wider
range of miscreants than simply officers charged with corruption. Auditor-General's annual
38Government of the North West Province, Summary of the final report of the Commission into corrupt
practices and irregular use of public funds in government departments and parastatal bodies by various
individuals or at their instance, Mmbatho, 1997. For corruption at a more humble level within the
Bophuthatswana administration see Jeremy Keenan, "Pandora's Box: The Private Accounts of a Bantustan
Community Authority" in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery, South African Review 3, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1986.
39Roger Southall, South Africa's Transkei, The Political Economy of an Independent Bantustan,
Heinemann, London, 1982, p. 179.
^The Report of the Ciskei Commission, Conference Associates, Pretoria, 1980, p. 33.
41
 Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of
"Loyal Resistance", Ravan, Johannesburg, 1987, p. 91.
42Josette Cole, Crossroads: The Politics of Reform and Repression, 1976-1986, Ravan, Johannesburg,
1987, p. 63.
43Mia Brandel Syrier, Reeftown Elite, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971, p. 33.
'"Philip Frankel, "The Politics of Police Control", Comparative Politics, 12, 4, 1980, p. 487.
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reports ceased to detail "defalcations and irregularities" in 1967, significantly after the 1966
figures reported 58 such incidences with respect to the police, an unprecedentedly high figure
and following a steady increase in police fraud in previous years45. Of course the repeal of
pass laws and restrictive liquor legislation ended the two most common opportunities for
police bribery and extortion. As late as 1975, according to recent trial evidence, Greek hotel
owner Alex Kavouras bribed policemen to obtain a liquor licence for his associate Joe Kgasi,
the leader of a well known criminal syndicate and the owner of Johannesburg's first
multiracial nightclub. Kavouras told the court: "I had connections with the fourth floor
(senior policemen at John Vorster square) and the Liquor Board. I organised the police to
turn a blind eye"46. Though the illicit opportunities supplied by liquor restrictions and pass
laws have long since disappeared among black South Africans the police retained an enviable
reputation for dishonesty: a survey conducted through a questionnaire inserted into a
November 1995 issue of the Sowetan found that 67 per cent of its respondents were
convinced that police force members accepted bribes47.
Petty corruption, though, was not endemic in all the lower echelons of the South African
bureaucracy, rather, before 1994 it tended to be concentrated in those areas in which officials
encountered people who were particularly rightless and defenceless. Amongst white South
Africans experience of corruption would have been exceptional rather than normal, and
concentrated in municipal rather than national state agencies (municipal traffic officers being
notoriously susceptible to bribes)48.
4. The incidence and location of political corruption in post-apartheid South Africa.
It would be surprising if there was no significant political corruption in contemporary South
Africa. Authoritarian and secretive governments are especially susceptible to bureaucratic
venality and, as we have seen during the last decades of apartheid South Africa's
administration was no exception to this generalisation. The more powerless ordinary people
were the more officials abused their position; for this reason homeland governments were
especially dishonest as were the central government departments such as Development Aid
which worked most closely with them. Secret budgets allowed senior security officials to
misuse funds for private gain and by removing procurement from public scrutiny they created
ample opportunities for bribery. "Strategic" kinds of government expenditure did not have
to be defended in public, whether they involved defence projects, propaganda exercises, or
sanctions evasions and all these featured large scale misappropriation of public resources.
Given that much of the administration is still run by the same people, it would be reasonable
45Republic of South Africa, Report of the Controller and the Auditor-General for the financial year, 1966-
1967, Pretoria, RP 60, 1967.
^Peter de Ionno, "Fall of a vice baron", Sunday Times Metro, 16 March, 1997.
47Marketing and Media Research, Sowetan Crime Survey: Presentation of Crime Findings, Johannesburg,
January 1996, p. 12.
48For examples of local authority corruption see Danny Sing and Malcolm wallis, "Corruption and
nepotism" in Fanie Cloete and Job Mokgoro, Policies for Public Service Transformation, Juta, Cape Town,
1995, p. 143-144.
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to expect the continuation of a certain amount of corruption. The following overview of new
South African corruption begins by surveying its incidence in provincial governments, where
it appears to be most concentrated, before considering political corruption in central
government and parastatal bodies.
Seven of the nine regional governments had to absorb homeland administrations into their
bureaucracies. The least corrupt regional administrations seem to be the two which have not
incorporated former homelands, Gauteng and the Western Cape. Gauteng has received
official praise for the efficiency of its financial management but Tokyo Sexwale's boast in
early 1997 that his government could claim "three corruption free years" was an
overstatement49. Gauteng's record is marred by the widespread sale of matriculation
examination papers50, huge amounts of thefts by officials in Johannesburg pension offices,
sometimes to the scale of R2 million a day as well as frequent bribery to jump the pension
queues51, fraud to the tune of Rl million in the Housing and Land Affairs Department
(which might help to explain the large discrepancy between the number of subsidies handed
out and the number of low cost homes which are under construction)52, accusations of
nepotism in the appointment of school principals53, and the defrauding of R800,000 from the
department of education by senior bureaucrats54. Gauteng's leaders cannot plead that they
have had to absorb corrupt homelands - there weren't any within the region's boundaries.
In any case they make a point of emphasising how far reaching the managerial revolution has
been in the administration with half the senior posts now filled by new people. Therefore,
much of this corruption cannot be explained by references to the apartheid heritage.
Compared to some of its neighbours, though, Gauteng is an island of probity. Mpumalanga' s
administration has been characterised by extreme forms of graft amongst political notables.
R1.3 million from the low cost housing budget was used by the region's MEC's to renovate
their state houses. An additional home improvement, this time involving the construction of
a guard-house at the deputy speaker's residence, led to the overpayment of R208,000 to a
local building firm in 199655. The MEC for Environmental Affairs was discovered to have
49
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filed false expense claims for an official visit to Disneyworld56. The MEC for Safety and
Security, Steve Mabona, lost his post after an official inquiry found him to have colluded
with officials in his traffic department to issue illegal driving licences, including one to the
Deputy Speaker of the House of Assembly. Earlier, Mabona had been the Minister of Police
in the KwaNdebele government and was identified by the Parsons Commission as the
recipient of an illegal government loan. Lower down the hierarchy is the case of the Director
of the Provincial Parks Board, Alan Gray, who not content with the R34,000 salary he
receives every month, hires out to the Board the services of two businesses he owns57. Not
to be outdone, the former chairman of the Mpumalanga Development Corporation managed
to spend his way through about R14,000 expenses a month before being dismissed for
impropriety; he then succeeded in securing his reinstatement and only left his post after the
payment of a large gratuity58. In 1997, the provincial housing department has become the
centre of a major financial scandal as a consequence of the award of a huge R190 million
contract without regular tendering procedures; the extent to which corruption may have
featured in this undertaking has yet to be established but the fact that one member of the
provincial housing board, Job Mthombeni, was also a director of the company, Motheo
Construction, which won the contract, is suggestive. The firm's chief executive, Thandi
Ddlovu is an old associate of the national Minister of Housing; they became friends in exile.
The housing scheme included provision for a profit margin in excess of 15 per cent, about
three times what is normal in the industry59. Meanwhile, land transfers by former homeland
authorities to various Mpumalanga politicians and officials have provoked another official
investigation60. In the lower reaches of the provincial government, audits have discovered
amounts ranging from R4.1million to R30 million as missing and unaccounted for from the
primary school feedings scheme61. The scheme has supplied rich pickings nation-wide for
minor officials, school administrators and small contractors in most of the provinces, though
losses seem to have been largest in Mpumalanga; only in the Western Cape where black
business empowerment principles were ignored and it was handed over to an experienced
NGO, the Peninsula school Feeding Scheme, has it functioned with complete honesty62.
Other peaks of political corruption in the regions include the R4 million paid to "ghost"
56
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workers in Kwa Zulu-Natal's Department of Nature Conservation63 and the nearly Rl million
stolen by a single official in Kwa-Zulu-Natal's Department of Finance. The Auditor-General
discovered that overpayments to suppliers and employees may have totalled as much as R400
million in Kwa Zulu in 1994/9564. In the Eastern Cape, the corruption ledger included by
November 1996 "the loss of all but one spanner and a few spare parts from the government
garage in Umtata, the gambling away of money earmarked for a new road; the defrauding
of R5.3 million from the justice department in Lusikisiki and R4.4 million from the health
department in Bisho; and the pilfering of government cheques for more than R31 million"65.
The province is believed to employ 8,000 "ghost" workers66. In the Northern Province the
decision by the government in Pietersburg to spend not merely R300 million on a new
parliament building but also to divert another R33 million to construct official residences for
each member of the regional parliament was authorised neither by the cabinet nor the tender
board, emanating instead from the premier's office. Opponents of the scheme were
characterised as "dissidents" by the premier's supporters67. Later the project was suspended.
Major irregularities in the award of tenders were an inevitable accompaniment of this
particular undertaking, though the Semenya Commission found that no official gained
financially. In the North West civil servants in the Department of Public Works authorised
a cheque for R20 million in payment for electronic equipment invoiced at R126.00068.
Nation-wide, ten MEC's have been identified in the press as being implicated in corrupt
practices: that is about ten per cent of the total number of regional "ministers"69. If this was
the proportion of corruption embodied in regional political leadership, it might well be the
case that a similar share of senior managers and junior officials have also been affected by
63
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the virus. Seven of the MEC's accused of corruption lost their posts two in the Free State
and two in the North West, two in the Northern Province, and one in Mpumalanga; in the
case of the Free State, though, despite the findings of a investigative commission which
confirmed the accusations against one of the sacked MEC's, the premier, Patrick Lekota was
removed from his office because of his willingness to publicise the culpability of his
colleagues.
Political corruption doesn't appear to be so prevalent in central government: here is
concentrated in particular departments, but its particular location is especially damaging. The
corruption roll call includes Home Affairs which includes among its activities the operation
of major driving licence scams throughout the country, the SA Revenue Service where
officials are currently undergoing investigation for fraud totalling R800,000, and a murky
history of tendering in the Department of Health - which while it may not have involved
dishonest behaviour by its officials and representatives (except for the many lies they have
told) has allowed private contractors lavish and self serving expenditure of public funds. In
the case of Home Affairs, over the years officials in licensing departments have issued more
than 1.3 million registration numbers, while a further 750 instances of corruption by Home
affairs functionaries have sold at least 270 blank passports70. In the Revenue Service, a
merger between Inland revenue and Customs in 1996 facilitated the misappropriation of
PA YE cheques; of a supposed establishment of 300 customs inspectors, only 20 remain and
this too has made it much easier for importers to evade duties through bribery71. Though the
Public Protector's investigation of the "Sarafina" affair did not indicate that officials sought
personal gain through neglecting regular tendering procedures it did feature the kind of heavy
handed efforts to prevent disclosures which cause corruption. Director General Olive Shisana
in the month following the outcry over the Sarafina contract ordered her subordinates to sign
an oath of secrecy to stop "sensitive information which can cause the department and
eventually the state embarrassment from falling into the wrong hands". The misuse of
European Union money to fund the Sarafina aids musical was partly a consequence of
officials not realising that donor money was subject to the normal rules, though it may also
have been an effect of ministerial impatience with established bureaucratic procedures. In
parliament, the ANC whip changed the order of the debate to ensure that the Minister would
not be present while the ANC chair of the portfolio committee dismissed opposition calls for
an inquiry as "spurious and politically motivated". Subsequently to the Sarafina scandal, a
further report appeared of health department officials awarding a contract despite Tender
Board refusal of two applications for approval72.
The real citadels of official self-enrichment, though, are to be found in three central
70Blackman Ngoro, "State officials in R13m fake passport scam", Sunday Independent, 15 June, 1997;
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government ministries: Social Welfare, Safety and Security, and Justice. As a general rule
of thumb, the more a civil service bureaucracy has to do with the public, the more likely it
is to be dishonest in its dealings. In the case of Welfare, the problems are mainly attributable
to the legacy of pre-1994 era. The Department inherited 14 separate bureaucracies, many of
them very venal and extremely incompetent. There was no centralised record of 2.8million
entitlements to pension payments and many of the supposed recipients were dead. It is
reckoned that about ten per cent of the Department's budget is lost to official fraud. Reform
has been slow, partly because of the complexity of the task, but also perhaps that the first
GNU Minister of Welfare, Abe Williams, was himself a major culprit in a pension fraud
scandal which affected the old pension department of the House of Representatives. Williams
was forced to resign after an investigation by the Western Cape MEC for health and Social
services suggested that he had accepted a bribe from a company contracted to distribute
pension funds and which had been allowed access to the interest accumulated from banking
the unpaid pensions73.
The police rival the pension administrators in their predisposition towards corruption. In
1995-1996, 8,000 police in Gauteng alone were reported to have committed crimes of one
kind or another74. In Johannesburg, according to the divisional police chief interviewed in
1996, four police a week were suspended for corruption75 and 1,076 policemen nationally
were under investigation for corruption in 1996, an increase from 89 investigations in 1995,
56 in 1994 and 32 in 199376. In 1996, again merely in Gauteng, R5 million worth of cars
were stolen, most likely by policemen from the car pounds in which the police keep the cars
which have already been stolen. Ten million rands was allocated at the beginning of 1997
to build new police proof maximum security car forts to prevent further thefts of this kind77.
In Rustenberg, a station commander was discovered in 1995 to be running a car theft
syndicate in cahoots with professional criminals. Since then there has been an epidemic of
reports of collusion between police and vehicle theft syndicates with police supplying
registration papers for stolen cars; police are also believed to be involved in contract killings
and prostitution rackets78. In 1995 2,000 policemen defrauded their medical aid scheme of
R60 million79. A major bribery scandal implicated police at Johannesburg's container
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In February 1997 five members of the Benoni flying squad were arrested on bribery
charges81. Police were discovered to have extorted thousands of rands from people they
illegally arrested and held in cells in the Sandton area, mainly on suspicion of illegal
immigration82. According to the SAP Anti-Corruption Unit, police corruption was believed
to have increased by 8 per cent in 1995; about half the 800 allegations investigated by the
unit were located in Gauteng. Among the officers charged with corruption was Charlie
Landman, head of the elite Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad83. Policemen collude with
employees of the Department of Justice to massively expand the scope of public corruption
through assisting magistrates and prosecutors in the wholesale theft and deliberate loss of
dockets in return for bribes from charged criminals. This practice is especially widespread
in the Western Cape and in Gauteng but it exists everywhere: several thousand cases each
year do not reach court, causing wastage and loss of millions of rands. It may reflect
historically entrenched habits but a recent wave of resignations by prosecutors and threats of
strike action suggest that the present demoralisation of the prosecution service may have
encouraged the spread of court venality84. Government austerity since the election as well
as rising crime levels have contributed to the financial woes of the Justice Department.
The parastatal sector has supplied rich seams of official corruption. Telkom and the Post
Office lost R201 million due to employee fraud in the 1995U996 year (which does not
include the sacks of letters misappropriated by postal sorters)85; one third of the SABC's
current losses are attributable to corruption, 121 Transnet managers were discovered last year
to be guilty of major abuse of their credit cards86, Eskom managers in Soweto made
substantial profits by awarding tenders to companies owned by former colleagues87, R500
000 RDP funds was alleged to have disappeared into the pockets of Portnet's Durban
managers, and the Independent Broadcasting Authority directors were forced to resign after
an inquiry continues to be led by people whose greed and extravagance seems to know no
limits a had revealed misuse of official travel and entertainment budgets running into millions
of rands. At least four managing directors of parastatals or public corporations have been
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involved in improper self-enriching activity.
Does the extent of corruption in central and regional government represent a problem of crisis
level proportions? In 1997 Deloitte and Touche spokesmen suggested that the overall cost
of public sector fraud and mismanagement could easily exceed RIO million88, which would
make it comparable in scale to the extent of abuse in countries considered to be endemically
corrupt. It is certainly systemic in certain provincial departments - its appearance at both
high and lowly levels and its evident repetition confirm this and it seems to be routinised in
police stations. So far, there is little evidence of corruption amongst National Assembly
members or amongst cabinet members, or amongst senior officials in national state
departments. At seven per cent of public expenditure its real proportional cost could be much
higher because only a small proportion of the government's budget is invested in capital or
developmental projects. As well as this any assessment of the effects of South African
political corruption should include in the reckoning its impact on the judicial system and the
way in which it strengthens popular political cynicism.
5. Is political corruption primarily an inheritance from the old regime?
It is difficult to know for certain whether the present levels of corruption represent a
substantial expansion of public dishonesty: corruption was very extensive in the old regime
and some of the conditions which allowed it to flourish have disappeared: homeland
administrations have ben incorporated and all government activities are now subject to well
publicised audits and the extension of the franchise should in theory make government more
accountable. However there are many new sources of stimulation for corrupt behaviour.
These include non-meritocratic processes of bureaucratic recruitment and promotion inherent
in certain kinds of "affirmative action", tendering principles which favour small businesses
(and which require much more efficient administration if they are to be handled honestly),
increasing shortages of skilled manpower in the public service especially in its financial
control systems, a range of new sources of public finance, including foreign-derived
development aid, and an ambitious expansion of the kinds and quantity of citizen entitlements
to public resources. Inexperienced ministers and new public managers are often ignorant of
tendering procedures: as the spokesmen for one of the Northern Province's MEC's conceded:
"We have never ruled before. We never even knew what a tender board was before we came
to power"89. In a newly competitive political environment, political parties are increasingly
dependent upon private sector finance. The ANC which in 1994 accepted a secret campaign
donation from a hotel magnate facing bribery charges and subsequently denied it has since
adopted the practice of taking fees for private appearances at business functions by cabinet
ministers90. The Inkatha Freedom Party accepted donations from illegal casino operators
while the Kwa-Zulu Natal government began preparing legislation regulate the gambling
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industry91. These kinds of actions are at the very least conducive to transactive forms of
political corruption. Also potentially harmful is the ANC's apparently indulgent attitude to
corruption within its own ranks. Shortly before Allen Boesak's return to South Africa to
undergo trial for fraud, in the Western Cape in February 1997, the provincial executive "had
resolved to support Boesak and welcome him in the way he deserved to be welcomed"92,
a decision which resulted in a delegation assembled at the airport to greet Boesak on arrival,
headed by the Minister of Justice in his Western Cape chairman. Meanwhile, in the Gauteng
legislature the ANC appointed to a committee established to monitor police conduct, one
Oupa Monareng, convicted in 1995 of bribing a policeman to avoid arrest for possession of
a stolen car93. A similar tolerance was shown to Winnie Mandela when she was appointed
to a deputy ministership in 1994, only a year after an internal ANC investigation had
discovered serious shortcomings in her management of its social welfare department.
As important as these incitements to bureaucratic misbehaviour has been the culture of greed
which has developed around high public office and in senior levels of management in the
public sector. Parastatal managers who award themselves R900,000 renumeration packages,
Youth and Truth Commissioners who get paid like high court judges, members of parliament
who award themselves 15 per cent pay increases before passing a single act of social reform,
Johannesburg city councillors who outfit their offices with entertainment facilities, and
ministers who travel at public expense to international sports events may not be breaking the
law but they are certainly encouraging corruption. In general, the doctrine that the public
service should emulate the private sector in its managerial payment scales and internal
business principles is probably unhealthy: South African private managers are paid very
generously, given the wage differentials which characterise most companies and the South
African private sector is believed to be one of the most fraudulent in the world94.
As noted at the beginning of this essay, many people think that there has been an increase in
corruption: even the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, has said that there has been a growth
in administrative corruption since 1994, though he qualified this assertion by acknowledging
that its "seeds... were sown long before we came into the government"95. The evidence
surveyed here suggests that though old habits and predispositions may well sustain much of
the existing administrative corruption, its apparent expansion is also the consequence of
change. As the theoretical literature surveyed at the beginning of the paper suggests, the
simultaneous democratisation and restructuring of the South African state makes it very
vulnerable to corruption, as has the absorbtion into its cadres and governors of a new political
class with recent experience of severe poverty. Certainly there is also a new public
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awareness of the issue and a variety of bureaucratic and political measures have been
instituted to check its progress, including the Public Protector's office, a number of internal
departmental investigative units, commissions of inquiry, rationalisation of records, and a
register of MP's interests. To date, though, no political office-holder has been charged and
convicted for corruption; international experience suggests that it is the litmus test of the
effectiveness of control measures.
